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Many countries have 
expanded at a rapid pace 
for long periods. But as 
they get richer, their growth 
rates tend to slow and 
they can’t attain the U.S. 
standard of living. 
T
wenty years ago, a visitor to Beijing would have been struck by 
the bicycle’s popularity as a form of mass transportation. Today, 
auto congestion and pollution on the increasingly clogged roads of China’s 
capital city are pervasive features. In a little more than three decades, China 
has transformed itself from a largely closed agrarian society to an urban 
exporting nation commonly viewed as the workshop of the world. 
At current growth rates, China will be the world’s largest economy 
sometime in the next decade. But will it ever be the richest?  Though pro-
viding a definitive answer is difficult—at least in terms of standard of liv-
ing—examining how China and other developing economies grow offers 
insight into how, with maturity, these nations may approach the techno-
logical leadership and, by extension, the standard of living of the U.S.     
Gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of everything produced 
within a country’s borders, is the most widely available means of calculat-
ing just how rich a country and its citizens are.1 In 2010, China’s GDP was 
14.12 trillion yuan (measured in 1990 yuan to control for inflation), accord-
ing to the nation’s statistical office; U.S. GDP was $13.25 trillion (measured 
in 2005 dollars to control for inflation). 
Two adjustments are required to compare the two numbers and 
determine which economy is bigger. We set a common year for both 
price series and convert them to a common currency unit. The simplest 
approach is to measure GDP in U.S. dollars at 2005 prices and use 2005 
exchange rates. Doing so results in estimated 2010 Chinese GDP of $3.88 
trillion in 2005 dollars, or just less than 30 percent of U.S. GDP. China’s 
economy will exceed that of the U.S. in 2025 if it continues expanding at 
its past-decade rate of just more than 10 percent a year and the U.S. keeps 
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growing at the 1.7 percent annual rate 
it experienced during the period. 
Per capita GDP allows us to com-
pare the relative well-being of residents 
of the two nations. Based on the 2010 
U.S. population of 309 million, per cap-
ita GDP was $42,874 last year. China, 
with a 2010 population of 1.34 billion, 
had per capita GDP of $2,893 last year, 
or 6.7 percent of the U.S. figure.
Making Cross-Country Comparisons
However, such comparisons are 
problematic, especially when com-
paring living standards across coun-
tries. For such questions economists 
prefer to use so-called purchasing 
power parity (PPP) exchange rates 
rather than market exchange rates. 
Purchasing power parity entails adjust-
ing exchange rates so that each cur-
rency can purchase a like amount of 
goods. These rates take into account 
that many so-called nontraded goods 
(items exclusively produced for 
home-country consumption) are a lot 
cheaper in poorer countries and allow 
a more accurate comparison of living 
standards across nations. The most 
recent estimates, compiled by research-
ers at the University of Pennsylvania 
for 2009, put China’s per capita GDP 
in 2005 U.S. dollars at $7,634, or about 
18 percent of the U.S. sum of $41,099 
that year. That is up from 8 percent of 
the U.S. level in 2000.  
So, is it likely that Chinese living 
standards will ever match those in the 
U.S.? To get a handle on this question, 
it is useful to look at other countries’ 
experiences over a long period. Many 
nations underwent development mira-
cles in the latter half of the 20th centu-
ry. Reviewing data on the evolution of 
global living standards over the period 
reveals two interesting facts. First, there 
are several countries where per capita 
GDP exceeds that of the U.S., often by 
significant amounts. Almost all of these 
nations are oil exporters. For them, per 
capita GDP may not accurately mea-
sure living standards because a signifi-
cant component of economic activity 
involves depleting the country’s natural 
resources or wealth. Thus, we exclude 
those nations from the analysis.2 
Second, other countries with per 
capita GDP significantly exceeding 
the U.S. level are generally small, with 
large, offshore financial centers. Given 
the well-known difficulties associated 
with determining financial-sector out-
put, per capita GDP in such nations 
may not  accurately measure living 
standards. So we also exclude them.3
Assessing an Initial Growth Spurt
Chart 1 is a scatter plot of the 
growth rate of real (inflation adjusted) 
per capita GDP against the level of per 
capita GDP for a large group of coun-
tries.4 Specifically, it shows the average 
growth rate over one decade against 
the level of real per capita GDP at the 
beginning of the decade.
Basic growth theory suggests that 
poor countries should grow more rap-
idly than rich countries. That is, the 
lower the level of per capita GDP at 
the beginning of a decade, the faster 
a country should expand over the fol-
lowing 10 years. And, indeed, this is 
generally what the chart shows. Note 
that some poor countries experienced 
growth disasters: Despite low levels 
of per capita GDP, living standards 
declined over 10 years or more. 
Excluding these observations from the 
sample, the tendency of growth to 
slow as countries get richer becomes 
more apparent.
Chart 2 shows how successful var-
ious countries have been at catching 
up to the U.S. Each point represents 
an observation for a single country for 
a single year.
We measure real per capita GDP 
in PPP dollars on the horizontal axis, 
while on the vertical axis we show 
per capita GDP as a percentage of 
U.S. per capita GDP. What is striking 
about the figure is that many countries 
come close to achieving U.S. standards 
of living, but essentially none achieve 
parity. 
This is even more apparent in 
Chart 3, which for comparison pres-
ents data for the wealthy, non-U.S. 
(G-7) countries and China. There was 
a period of rapid growth following the 
Chart 1
Per Capita GDP Growth Slows as Countries Develop
(Ten-year average growth rate versus level of real per capita GDP, 1950–2009)
Growth rate, real per capita GDP (percent)








Real per capita GDP in 2005 purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars
NOTE: Each square represents a single country over a decade.
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destruction of World War II when liv-
ing standards rose in countries such 
as Japan, Italy and France. But none 
of them caught up with the U.S. The 
chart reveals just how far China has 
to go to match the standards of living 
currently enjoyed by the citizens of 
these countries.
Failing to Reach the U.S.
Why do countries fail to reach U.S. 
living standards? Therein lies something 
of a mystery. Economists speak of a 
middle-income transition, or middle-
income trap, where previously rapidly 
growing economies slow down dra-
matically and never achieve the same 
standard of living as the technological 
leader. The reasons for this are unclear. 
It may be that policies appropriate 
for one stage of development are less 
effective at later stages and that the 
institutional structure lacks the agility to 
adjust as circumstances change. 
In a recent paper, economists 
Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park 
and Kwanho Shin examined a large 
number of growth slowdowns over the 
past 50 years (declines in per capita 
GDP growth rates of at least 2 percent-
age points from rates of at least 3.5 
percent per annum).5 
The economists looked for fac-
tors correlated with these declines.
They found that the slowdowns tend 
to occur when per capita GDP reaches 
about $17,000 in 2005 PPP-adjusted 
dollars and when per capita GDP 
reaches about 58 percent of per capita 
GDP in the lead country. Maintenance 
of an undervalued exchange rate 
also appeared correlated with the 
slowdowns.
Barring some major shock, it 
appears China’s economy will inevita-
bly become larger than that of the U.S. 
sometime in the next decade. In many 
ways, this simply reflects the sheer size 
of China’s population, currently more 
than four times that of the U.S. popu-
lation. Even so, a lot of uncertainty 
remains about whether individual 
Chinese citizens will ever be as rich as 
their American counterparts.
 Considering the Future
As  noted, many countries have 
expanded at a rapid pace for long 
periods. But as they get richer, their 
Chart 2
Countries Approach but Don’t Surpass U.S. Per Capita GDP
(Data for the period 1950–2009)
Real per capita GDP relative to U.S. per capita GDP (percent)








Real per capita GDP in 2005 purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars
U.S. real per capita GDP
NOTE: Each square represents a single country over a one-year period.
SOURCES: Penn World Tables, version 7.0; author’s calculations.
Chart 3
G-7 Members and China: Catching Up with the U.S.?
(Data for the period 1950–2009)
Real per capita GDP relative to U.S. per capita GDP (percent)
















U.S. real per capita GDP
NOTE: Each square represents the country over a one-year period.
SOURCES: Penn World Tables, version 7.0; author’s calculations.
growth rates tend to slow and they 
can’t attain the U.S. standard of living. 
For most of the 20th century, the U.S. 
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which other countries could aspire. 
That remains the case today, and 
absent any major policy errors in the 
U.S., it should continue.
 In 1820, China was responsible 
for about one-third of global GDP, 
while the U.S. accounted for just 1.8 
percent. So, the likely shift in relative 
size in the next decade is in some 
ways simply a return to what we 
previously experienced.6 Even then, 
U.S. living standards were twice those 
of China. If China were to become 
the first country to completely close 
the gap with the U.S., it would mark 
a significant break with develop-
ment patterns observed over the past 
half-century.
Wynne is a senior economist and vice 
president at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas and director of its Globalization 
and Monetary Policy Institute.
Notes
Special thanks to Payton Odom for research 
assistance.
1 The ideal way to calculate wealth would involve 
computing the value of all assets owned by a 
country’s citizens. This accounting would include 
the value of the country’s natural resources, the 
accumulated stock of physical capital and the 
value of foreign investments. But such measures 
are hard to come by, and instead we often 
resort to more readily available proxies, such 
as the amount of income annually generated or 
produced. 
2 The countries specified as oil exporters are 
the same ones the International Monetary Fund 
so designates in its World Economic Outlook 
publication: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela and Yemen. We also exclude 
Brunei Darussalam because of the large size of its 
natural gas sector relative to GDP.
3 The countries excluded are those designated 
offshore financial centers by the Financial Stabil-
ity Forum, namely Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, 
Lebanon,  Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Panama, Samoa, 
Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Switzerland 
and Vanuatu.
4 See Penn World Table Version 7.0, by Alan Hes-
ton, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Center 
for International Comparisons of Production, 
Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylva-
nia, May 2011. 
5 See “When Fast Growing Economies Slow 
Down: International Evidence and Implications 
for China,” by Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park 
and Kwanho Shin, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper no. 16919, March 2011.
6 See Chinese Economic Performance in the Long 
Run, Second Edition, Revised and Updated: 960-
2030 AD, by Angus Maddison, Paris: Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2007.